October 5, 2026

Admiralty and Maritime Law Updates: September 2026

October 5, 2026

In September 2026, courts dealt with situations that the maritime industry and its lawyers know all too well, such as cargo lost, damaged, or never delivered, or a cruise passenger injured on board and suing the cruise line. But before a court can decide who is liable, it must first resolve any dispute over threshold questions, such as which law applies and where the case must be heard. When COGSA meets a paramount clause pointing to Turkish law, which one governs? Will a U.S. court enforce a cruise ticket’s forum-selection clause that sends a passenger’s claim to a foreign court? What happens to a claim when the claimant has not followed a contractual claims procedure? Read on to find out how the courts answered these questions and what else happened in admiralty and maritime law this month.

Paramount Clause Points to Turkish Law, Not COGSA, Federal Court in Illinois Holds

Thyssenkrupp Materials NA, Inc. v. M/V Drawsko, No. 23-CV-03086, 2026 WL 2720595 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2026)

ThyssenKrupp Materials NA, Inc. and ThyssenKrupp Materials Trading NA, LLC sued the M/V Drawsko and her owners for loss of and damage to cargo carried by sea from Turkey to the United States. The dispute centered on which law governed the carrier’s liability.

The bills of lading contained a General Paramount Clause,¹ which set out a three-step fallback in paragraph (a), with each step operating only if the preceding one did not. First, the clause provided that the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading (Brussels, 1924) (the Hague Rules), “as enacted in the country of shipment,” would apply. Second, if no such enactment was in force there, it called for the application of the destination country’s legislation enacting the Hague Rules (here, COGSA). Third, for shipments to which no such enactment applied compulsorily, it stipulated that the Hague Rules themselves would apply as contractual terms. Paragraph (b) operated independently of this sequence: in trades where the Hague-Visby Rules applied compulsorily, it provided that the relevant Hague-Visby legislation would govern in place of the regime identified under paragraph (a).

The choice of law was decisive because it determined the limit of liability available to the carrier. The defendants argued for the application of COGSA and its $500 per-package limit. Relying on a Turkish law expert, they contended that the Hague Rules are not “in force” in Turkey because Turkish courts almost never apply them directly and instead look to the Turkish Commercial Code. If Turkey had no enactment, the clause would fall through to the destination country, the United States, and therefore to COGSA.

The district court rejected that argument. Turkey ratified the Hague Rules in 1955 and incorporated them into the Turkish Commercial Code, just as the United States did through COGSA. That domestic code is therefore precisely the “Hague Rules … as enacted in the country of shipment,” the first tier of the General Paramount Clause. The court found support in Article 8 of the Hague Rules, which preserves domestic statutes on shipowners’ limitation of liability. In the court’s view, it would make no sense to treat a state’s enactment of the Hague Rules as no longer in force simply because its courts apply their own domestic statute, which the Hague Rules themselves expressly permit.

The court added that even if COGSA applied compulsorily to this inbound U.S. shipment, the outcome would be the same because COGSA allows parties to contract for a higher limit of liability. The court reasoned that, by choosing the Hague Rules as enacted in the country of shipment (here, Turkey), the parties agreed to be bound by Article 1186 of the Turkish Commercial Code, which sets a limit of 666.67 units of account per package or 2 units of account per kilogram, whichever is higher. In the court’s view, this was a permissible contractual choice of a higher liability limit, which COGSA expressly allows. The court therefore concluded that the defendants could not limit their liability to $500 per package under COGSA.

Read the court’s memorandum opinion and order here.

Commentary: One notable feature of this decision is the order of the court’s analysis. The court began with the general maritime choice-of-law rule that courts look first to the law the parties chose in their contract and then treated the General Paramount Clause as determining the applicable liability regime. That rule, however, has limits. Where a statute applies by force of law (ex proprio vigore), the parties cannot contract out of its mandatory protections. COGSA is such a statute: it “applies ex proprio vigore to all contracts for carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in foreign trade.”² “United States courts must apply COGSA, when its terms so require, regardless where bills of lading were issued or whence carriage began.”³ Where COGSA applies, the parties cannot lessen the carrier’s liability below COGSA’s limits (§ 3(8)), although they may agree to a higher limit (§ 4(5)). Because this shipment ran from Turkey to the United States, COGSA might have offered a natural starting point.

The court instead interpreted the paramount clause first and turned to COGSA only at the end, as an alternative ground. Notably, the court did not firmly hold that COGSA applied compulsorily. Although it acknowledged in its background discussion that COGSA applies compulsorily to shipments to and from U.S. ports in foreign trade, its analysis proceeded on the basis that “even if” COGSA applied, the statute permits parties “to contract for their chosen liability limitation.” In the court’s view, the parties agreed to a higher limit here. By providing that “the Hague Rules … as enacted in the country of shipment” would govern, the bills of lading pointed to the Turkish Commercial Code, which sets a limit well above COGSA’s $500 per package. The court treated this as “a contractual agreement to be bound by this higher liability limit” and gave it effect.

The court’s choice of analytical framework leaves two questions open.

First, the court’s framework does not readily answer what would happen if the incorporated foreign limit were lower than COGSA’s. On the court’s approach, the paramount clause designates the Turkish Commercial Code as the governing law, and COGSA enters the analysis only in the alternative. Had the Turkish limit been lower than $500 per package, that approach would seem to point toward the lower limit. But where COGSA applies compulsorily, § 3(8) voids any clause lessening the carrier’s liability, so a paramount clause pointing to a regime with a lower limit would likely not displace COGSA’s $500 floor. The court’s description of COGSA as permitting parties “to contract for their chosen liability limitation” is accurate only in one direction, and the outcome in Drawsko depended on the fact that the Turkish limit happened to be higher.

Second, starting from COGSA might have brought into focus the question on which U.S. courts are divided: whether a general paramount clause, on its own, shows that the parties agreed to a higher limit. In cases involving shipments from Hague-Visby countries to the United States, several courts have treated the identical paramount clause as sufficient proof that the parties agreed to the higher Hague-Visby limit rather than COGSA’s $500 per package. See, e.g., Ilva U.S.A., Inc. v. M/V Botic, No. CIV. A. 92-717, 1992 WL 296562 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 1992), aff’d sub nom. Ilva U.S.A., Inc. v. M/V Botic, 998 F.2d 1003 (3d Cir. 1993); Associated Metals v. M/V Star Skarven, 1995 WL 18251531 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 1994).

Other courts have taken a different view. In Acciai Speciali Terni USA, Inc. v. M/V Berane, 182 F. Supp. 2d 503 (D. Md. 2002), the court considered the same paramount clause in a bill of lading for a shipment of steel from Italy, a Hague-Visby country, to Baltimore. The court began with COGSA. Because the shipment was bound for the United States, COGSA applied compulsorily, “regardless of any provision in the bill of lading or foreign law to the contrary.” The court then asked whether the parties had intended the paramount clause to raise the carrier’s liability from $500 per package to the higher Hague-Visby level on shipments to the United States and concluded that they had not. In the court’s view, standard-form, “multi-tasking” language drafted to cover many trades did not show that the carrier had knowingly accepted higher limits on U.S. shipments, particularly where the shipper had paid nothing extra for them. The court held that COGSA, not the Hague-Visby Rules, determined the limit of the carrier’s liability. Drawsko did not address these arguments, and the Seventh Circuit does not appear to have considered whether this paramount clause, without more, establishes an agreement to a higher limit.

William Tetley, examining the issue through conflict of laws rules, concluded that “United States courts should apply the higher package and kilo limits of the Visby Rules, where their application is called for a) by the express intention of the parties, or b) by the implied intention of the parties or c) by virtue of the most significant relationship rule, enunciated in the Restatement Second and d) by the theories of governmental interest analysis and ‘choice-influencing considerations.’”⁴ In his view, “[i]t is within United States policy and in American interests that carriage of goods legislation should ensure the best possible compensation for American consignees in the event of loss of or damage to cargo.”⁵

Forum-Selection Clause Sends Royal Caribbean Passenger’s Injury Claim to English Courts, Federal Court in Florida Holds

Rahul Bagga v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 26-CV-20364, 2026 WL 2686699 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2026)

Rahul Bagga, a Canadian citizen and resident, was a passenger aboard Royal Caribbean’s Icon of the Seas. While taking part in an onboard scavenger hunt organized by the cruise line, he slipped twice on a wet surface in the ship’s ice rink and tore his anterior cruciate ligament and meniscus. He sued Royal Caribbean in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida for negligent maintenance, negligent failure to warn, and negligent design. Royal Caribbean moved to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, relying on a clause in his Canada Cruise Ticket Contract that required all disputes, including personal injury claims, to be litigated exclusively in the courts of England and Wales. The contract also chose English law.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. Bagga did not dispute that he had accepted the ticket contract or that the clause was reasonably communicated to him. He argued instead that litigating in England would be inconvenient and might limit his recovery under the Athens Convention. The court rejected both arguments. On inconvenience, it noted that travel to London was no more burdensome for a Canadian than travel to Miami. Royal Caribbean also showed, through a declaration from an English solicitor, that Bagga could take part in English proceedings largely remotely, and it consented to remote testimony. On remedies, the court held that a less favorable recovery does not make a forum-selection clause unenforceable unless the remedy is so inadequate as to be fundamentally unfair. Bagga had not even quantified his damages or the Athens Convention limits.

Applying the modified forum non conveniens analysis,⁶ the court found that the English courts were an adequate forum, that the public-interest factors favored dismissal (the case had little connection to Florida and English law governed), and that Bagga could refile in the alternative forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice, since Royal Caribbean had agreed to waive any statute-of-limitations defense based on the Ticket Contract’s one-year suit-filing deadline, provided that Bagga refiled his action in the courts of England and Wales within six months of the dismissal.

Takeaways: The decision confirms that cruise passengers face a heavy burden in overcoming the presumptive validity of forum-selection clauses in cruise ticket contracts. Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, “[a] plaintiff can defeat this presumption by showing that (1) the clause was induced by fraud or overreaching; (2) the plaintiff would be deprived of its day in court because of inconvenience or unfairness; (3) the chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; or (4) enforcement of the clause would contravene public policy.”⁷ Foreseeable inconvenience, a preference for in-person hearings, or the prospect of a lower recovery under the Athens Convention will not meet that standard without concrete evidence of fundamental unfairness. The case also shows how cruise lines can strengthen their position by offering practical concessions, such as consenting to remote proceedings and waiving time bars, which leave the passenger with little room to argue prejudice.

Read the court’s order here.

Federal Court in California Rejects Railroad’s COGSA Defense but Enforces Its Nine-Month Claim Deadline

MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. v. BNSF Railway Company, No. 2:24-CV-01038-SPG-KES, 2026 WL 2693875 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2026)

Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. (“MSC”), an ocean carrier, agreed with Epson America, Inc. (“Epson”) to carry twelve containers of Epson’s goods from the Philippines and Indonesia to Indiana via the Port of Los Angeles. MSC carried the containers by sea to Los Angeles. It then handed them to BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”), a railroad, for the rail leg to Chicago. MSC and BNSF had a separate contract for this rail service, which incorporated BNSF’s Intermodal Rules. Under those rules, a shipper (here, MSC) had to file a written claim within nine months of delivery before it could sue BNSF for lost or damaged cargo.

While the containers were in BNSF’s custody, goods were stolen from all twelve of them. Epson’s insurer, Tokio Marine America Insurance Company, sued MSC, and MSC settled for about $1.24 million. The two settlements were lump sums and did not say how much was paid for each container. MSC then sued BNSF to recover what it had paid.

BNSF moved for summary judgment on three grounds. First, it argued that COGSA applied to the dispute and either preempted or time-barred MSC’s claims. Second, it argued that MSC had missed the nine-month claim deadline for six containers. Third, it argued that MSC could not prove its damages because the settlements did not break down the payments by container.

The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California accepted BNSF’s second argument but rejected the first and third.

First, the court found that BNSF had not shown that COGSA applied to MSC’s claims against it. MSC’s contract with Epson extended COGSA to the entire time the goods were in the custody of MSC or its subcontractors, including BNSF’s rail leg. BNSF argued that it could take advantage of that contract through its Himalaya Clause,⁸ which gave subcontractors “the benefit of all terms and conditions of whatsoever nature contained herein or otherwise benefiting [MSC] under this Sea Waybill, as if such terms and conditions were expressly for their benefit.” The court disagreed. The language BNSF relied on was not a standalone provision but one sentence in a four-sentence clause, and the court read it in that context. Read as a whole, the clause barred the cargo owner (Epson) from suing MSC’s subcontractors and let a subcontractor rely on the contract’s defenses if Epson sued it anyway. It did not let a subcontractor use those defenses against the carrier that hired it (MSC). Because the parties had framed COGSA’s application as depending on whether BNSF could enforce the contract as a third-party beneficiary, and BNSF had not shown that it could, the court denied BNSF’s motion to the extent that it argued that COGSA preempted MSC’s claims or made them untimely.

Second, the nine-month claim deadline barred MSC’s claims for six containers. MSC admitted that its claims for containers three through seven were late. For container eleven, MSC argued that it had made a timely claim by attaching Tokio Marine’s letter, which mentioned that container, to its claim form. The court disagreed. The claim form requested payment only for containers eight through ten, and the court read the form itself as the “claim” under BNSF’s Intermodal Rules. MSC had not shown that the rules could plausibly be read to include attached third-party correspondence as part of the claim. MSC therefore lost its claims for six containers.

Third, in the court’s view, MSC had presented sufficient evidence to apportion its damages by container. The court held that a lump-sum settlement does not prevent recovery if other evidence shows how the payment should be divided. MSC produced an internal document valuing each container and declarations from the people who negotiated the settlements. That was enough to take the damages question to trial.

MSC’s claims for the remaining six containers will proceed.

Takeaways: Apart from the interpretation of the Himalaya Clause, which merits a more detailed discussion than this short review allows, a notable feature of the court’s order is its strict enforcement of BNSF’s contractual claim procedure. The contract between MSC and BNSF did not set out that procedure in its own text. Instead, it incorporated by reference BNSF’s Intermodal Rules, which in turn set out the claim procedure. Terms incorporated in this way can easily be overlooked, yet here they cost MSC its claims for half of the containers. Parties in the supply chain may therefore wish to review any rules, tariffs, or other documents incorporated by reference into their contracts with rail carriers, paying particular attention to claim procedures.

BNSF’s Nine-Month Suit Deadline Applies to Ocean Carrier’s Indemnity Claims, Federal Court in California Holds

The Continental Insurance Company v. Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. et al., No. 2:25-CV-02130-MRA-RAO, 2026 WL 2725376 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2026)

A shipment of remote-controlled toy vehicles was to be carried from Keelung, Taiwan, to Dallas, Texas, under a through sea waybill. COSCO Shipping Lines (“CSL”), an ocean common carrier, carried the cargo by sea to Long Beach, California. It then contracted with BNSF, a railroad, to carry the cargo by rail to Dallas. CSL and BNSF agreed that their contract incorporated BNSF’s Intermodal Rules. Under those rules, only the shipper (here, CSL) could bring a claim or lawsuit against BNSF for cargo loss or damage. To preserve its right to sue BNSF, a shipper needed to file a claim within nine months of delivery or, if the cargo was never delivered, within nine months of the scheduled delivery date. It then needed to sue within nine months after BNSF denied the claim or received it, whichever was later.

Part of the cargo was never delivered. Continental Insurance Company (“Continental”), the cargo owner’s insurer, paid the owner about $191,700 and then sued CSL to recover that amount. CSL in turn filed a third-party complaint against BNSF, alleging that the cargo was lost in BNSF’s custody and seeking indemnity and contribution for any amount CSL might owe Continental. CSL filed its third-party complaint on October 20, 2025, nearly 14 months after BNSF denied its claim on September 4, 2024. BNSF moved to dismiss, arguing that CSL had missed the nine-month deadline to sue.

The court granted BNSF’s motion and dismissed CSL’s claims against it without leave to amend.

CSL argued that its indemnity and contribution claims were not claims for cargo loss, so the Intermodal Rules’ deadlines did not apply to them. It also argued that general maritime law, rather than the Intermodal Rules, governed its claims and that, under that law, its indemnity and contribution claims had not yet accrued because there had been no final judgment or payment in the underlying action for cargo loss.

The court rejected both arguments. It followed two recent decisions from the same district involving the same Intermodal Rules: MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. v. BNSF Railway Company, 735 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2024), aff’d, No. 24-3957, 2025 WL 1924903 (9th Cir. July 14, 2025), and CMA CGM, S.A. v. BNSF Railway Company, No. CV 24-3369 PA (MARX), 2024 WL 5341195 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2024), aff’d, No. 25-292, 2026 WL 1831970 (9th Cir. June 25, 2026). Both held that the rules’ deadlines cover all claims connected with cargo loss or damage, including indemnity and contribution claims. As the CMA CGM court explained, because the rules bar cargo owners from suing BNSF directly, a shipper’s only way to recover from BNSF is through an indemnity claim, so the rules would make little sense if they did not apply to such claims.

Because CSL sued more than nine months after BNSF denied its claim, its claims were time-barred. The court emphasized that CSL and BNSF were sophisticated parties that could have negotiated different terms but chose to accept the Intermodal Rules. Since CSL could not cure the delay by amending its complaint, the court dismissed the claims without leave to amend.

Takeaways: This decision adds to a consistent line of authority in the Central District of California, backed by two Ninth Circuit affirmances. BNSF’s Intermodal Rules apply to an ocean carrier’s indemnity and contribution claims, and their deadlines run from BNSF’s denial of the claim, not from the date the ocean carrier is held liable or pays the cargo interests. Courts treat these deadlines as an agreed allocation of risk between sophisticated commercial parties. In practice, the ocean carrier may have to sue BNSF before the underlying cargo claim against it has been resolved.

Bills of Lading Must Identify Deck Cargo to Exclude It From the Hague-Visby Rules, English Court of Appeal Holds

Batavia Eximp & Contracting (S) Pte Ltd v Pedregal Maritime SA (The Taikoo Brilliance) [2026] EWCA Civ 1158

The Taikoo Brilliance carried a cargo of pine timber from New Zealand to India under four bills of lading. Because the cargo was shipped from New Zealand, the bills were compulsorily subject to the Hague-Visby Rules. They also required disputes to be resolved by arbitration. Part of the cargo was carried on deck. This matters because the Hague-Visby Rules do not apply to deck cargo if it is “stated as being carried on deck and is so carried” (Article I(c)). Two of the bills stated how many pieces of timber were carried on deck at the shipper’s risk, but not which pieces those were.

When the ship arrived at Kandla in September 2019, the original bills of lading were not available. A carrier should normally deliver cargo only to the person who presents an original bill. Rather than keep the ship waiting, however, the owners did what is common in the trade: they delivered the cargo to third parties without the bills, against a letter of indemnity from the charterer, in which the charterer promised to cover the owners against any resulting liability. Batavia Eximp & Contracting (S) Pte Ltd (“Batavia”), as holder of the bills, was the party entitled to the cargo, and it claimed that the owners had misdelivered it.

Under the Hague-Visby Rules, Batavia had one year from delivery to bring suit against the owners. Within that year, it started proceedings in Singapore and arrested a sister ship of the Taikoo Brilliance. Arresting a ship is a common way for cargo interests to secure a claim: to get the ship released, the shipowner must provide security, usually in the form of a P&I club letter of undertaking or a bank guarantee. Batavia achieved that, and the ship was released a week later once security was provided. The arrest, however, only secured the claim; it did not start the process for deciding it. The bills of lading required disputes to be resolved by arbitration, and the Singapore court stayed its proceedings on that basis. Batavia commenced arbitration only in December 2020, more than one year after delivery.

The owners did not argue that delivering without the bills was proper. Instead, they relied on Article III, rule 6 of the Hague-Visby Rules, under which the carrier is discharged from all liability unless “suit is brought” within one year of delivery. Batavia had a fallback argument for the deck cargo. Under Article I(c), cargo “stated as being carried on deck and is so carried” falls outside the Rules, and so outside the time bar. The arbitrator held that the Singapore proceedings were not “suit,” so the claim was time-barred, but only for the cargo carried below deck. Because the bills stated the quantities loaded on deck, he found that the deck cargo fell outside the Hague-Visby Rules under Article I(c), and so outside the time bar.

Both parties appealed to the Commercial Court on points of law under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996. Robin Knowles J dismissed Batavia’s appeal on the time bar, holding that “suit” means substantive proceedings that can decide the claim. He also dismissed the owners’ appeal on the deck cargo, holding that, “whilst best practice might call for a clearer statement than seen in this case, the arbitrator was not wrong in law to regard the statement as to what was carried on deck as sufficient to engage the exception.”

The Court of Appeal dismissed Batavia’s appeal and allowed the owners’ appeal, holding that the entire claim was time-barred.

First, the Singapore arrest did not stop the clock. “Suit” under Article III, rule 6 means proceedings that can decide the claim. Proceedings brought only to obtain security do not qualify. The court emphasized that the time bar is meant to give carriers certainty that they can close their books if no substantive claim is brought within a year and to ensure that claims are pursued promptly. Treating security proceedings as “suit” would defeat that purpose.

Second, the deck cargo was not excluded from the Hague-Visby Rules. The court held that, where only part of the cargo under a bill of lading is carried on deck and the items differ in value, rather than forming part of an entirely homogeneous cargo, “the statement on the bill must specifically identify the cargo to be carried on deck, such as by parcel number or serial number.” Because Batavia’s bills did not identify which pieces of timber were on deck, all the cargo remained subject to the Rules, and so to the one-year time bar.

Takeaways: The decision confirms that arresting a ship secures a claim but does not stop the Hague-Visby time bar. To do that, cargo interests must start proceedings on the merits, in the forum the contract requires, within one year of delivery, even while pursuing an arrest elsewhere. For carriers, the decision means that stating how much cargo is carried on deck may not take that cargo outside the Hague-Visby Rules: where the items differ in value, the bill must identify which items are on deck. In this case, the rule on deck cargo, which normally protects cargo interests, worked in the owners’ favor by bringing all the cargo within the time bar. The case also illustrates the risk of delivering against a letter of indemnity: the owners remained exposed to the holder’s claim and were saved by the time bar, not by the indemnity.

Read the judgment here.

FMC Clarifies the Procedures for Challenging Ocean Carrier Charges

On September 1, 2026, the Federal Maritime Commission (“FMC”) issued a final rule clarifying how parties can challenge charges imposed by ocean common carriers. The rule took effect on publication.

The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 2022 (“OSRA 2022”) allows any person to file a complaint with the FMC about charges assessed by an ocean common carrier, most commonly demurrage and detention charges. If the FMC finds that the charge does not comply with 46 U.S.C. § 41104(a) or § 41102, it orders the carrier to refund it and applies a civil penalty. For demurrage and detention, the burden is on the carrier to prove that the charge was reasonable. To handle these complaints, the FMC created an “Interim Procedure,” under which complaints are submitted by email. Many stakeholders came to view this as the only way to bring a charge complaint. It is not.

The rule amends the FMC’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (46 C.F.R. Part 502) to confirm that a charge complaint may be pursued through any of three routes:

The Interim Procedure: a free, streamlined procedure designed to resolve charge complaints quickly without requiring significant participation by the complainant. The complainant emails the charge complaint to the FMC, and FMC staff investigate it by asking the carrier to justify the charge. If the investigation supports a violation, the matter is referred to the FMC’s Bureau of Enforcement, Investigations, and Compliance for fast-track Show Cause proceedings, in which the carrier must show why it should not be ordered to refund or waive the charge. A separate civil penalty proceeding may follow.
Small claims (46 C.F.R. §§ 502.301–502.305): an informal procedure for claims of $50,000 or less, available only if both parties consent. A Small Claims Officer decides the claim on the parties’ written submissions, without formal proceedings. The filing fee is currently $176. If the carrier does not consent, the claim must proceed under the FMC’s formal procedures.
Formal complaint (46 C.F.R. § 502.61 et seq.): a full adjudication, usually before an administrative law judge, in which the complainant takes part as a party and may seek reparations for actual injury. The filing fee is currently $387.

Charge complaints are not limited to demurrage and detention. Although disputes over the reasonableness of demurrage and detention charges are the most common, a complaint may be submitted about any carrier fee or charge that does not comply with 46 U.S.C. § 41104(a) or § 41102.

Read the final rule here.

This concludes the selection of admiralty and maritime law updates for September 2026. Thank you for reading, and see you next month!

The information provided in this article is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. It should not be relied upon or applied without consulting an attorney to address your specific circumstances. Please note that this article was published on the date indicated and may not reflect subsequent changes in the law.