In almost all legal matters, two key strategic determinations must be made: (1) the choice of applicable law, and (2) the choice of forum.
In maritime law, the following rules apply with regard to the choice of applicable law and the choice of forum:
Choice of Applicable Law: Federal or State Law?
“[I]n the absence of some controlling statute, the general maritime law, as accepted by the Federal courts, constitutes part of our national law, applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215, 37 S. Ct. 524, 528, 61 L. Ed. 1086 (1917). The general maritime law is judge-made substantive maritime law.
“[T]he general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state legislation” unless such legislation (1) “contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress,” or (2) “works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law,” or (3) “interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.” Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216, 37 S. Ct. 529.
Choice of Forum: Federal or State Courts?
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution “vests federal courts with jurisdiction over all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 443, 121 S. Ct. 993, 998 (2001).
The jurisdictional statute elaborates that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of … [a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction,” but from this grant of exclusive jurisdiction it “sav[es] to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (emphasis added).
The highlighted provision is commonly referred to as the “saving to suitors” clause. It gives plaintiffs the option to refrain from designating their claims as admiralty claims and sue at law, i.e., bring their claims in state court or in federal court when there exists some independent basis for federal jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizenship.
Unless the applicable statute provides otherwise, plaintiffs with in personam maritime claims have three alternatives: (1) to proceed in federal court sitting in admiralty; (2) to proceed in federal court at law, assuming an alternative basis for federal jurisdiction; or (3) to proceed in state court. See Ghotra by Ghotra v. Bandila Shipping, Inc., 113 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] plaintiff with in personam maritime claims has three choices: He may file suit in federal court under the federal court’s admiralty jurisdiction, in federal court under diversity jurisdiction if the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy is satisfied, or in state court.”).
The most significant difference between maritime claims brought in admiralty and at law is the right to a jury trial. In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, the district court which subject matter jurisdiction is based solely on admiralty decides the case without a jury. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(e); see also Ghotra, 113 F.3d at 1054 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here is no right to jury trial if general admiralty jurisdiction is invoked, while it is preserved for claims based in diversity or brought in state court.”).
Federal and state law may provide different remedies. Federal and state courts apply different procedural rules. Accordingly, a party may argue for the application of state law to make its case as advantageous as possible, and/or choose not to designate its claim as an admiralty claim and sue at law to ensure access to a jury trial.
In the case decided by the Seventh Circuit on August 6, 2024, the plaintiffs relied on both federal and state law to make their cases as advantageous as possible and requested a jury trial in federal court. See In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, 110 F.4th 1007 (7th Cir. 2024).
How did the court respond to these requests? Read on for more details.
In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, 110 F.4th 1007 (7th Cir. 2024).
This consolidated action arose out of a Boeing 737 MAX crash that occurred on October 29, 2018. Less than 13 minutes after its takeoff from Jakarta, Indonesia, it crashed into the Java Sea, about 18 miles off the coast of Indonesia. Everyone on board died.
The representatives of two passengers brought actions against Boeing and other defendants (collectively, “Boeing”), asserting the following claims:
Plaintiff No. 1: (1) wrongful-death claims arising under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) and the Illinois Wrongful Death Act; (2) survival claims for property damage and pre-death fear and injury.
Plaintiff No. 2: (1) wrongful-death and survival claims based on theories of strict products liability, negligence, and breach of implied warranties; (2) survival claims of pre-death injury, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and fraud.
Both plaintiffs demanded a jury trial.
Boeing filed motions in each of these cases, asking the district court to rule that DOHSA applies, preempts all of the plaintiffs’ non-DOHSA claims, and mandates a bench trial. The district court granted Boeing’s motions. The plaintiffs appealed.
The Seventh Circuit addressed the following issues: (1) Is DOHSA the sole source of potential recovery for the plaintiffs, or can the plaintiffs assert other claims as well? (2) Are the plaintiffs entitled to jury trial?
Is DOHSA the sole source of potential recovery for the plaintiffs, or can the plaintiffs assert other claims as well?
In addressing whether DOHSA is the sole source of potential recovery for the plaintiffs, the Seventh Circuit agreed that it is.
DOHSA provides that, “[w]hen the death of an individual is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore of the United States, the personal representative of the decedent may bring a civil action in admiralty against the person or vessel responsible.” 46 U.S.C. § 30302.
The Seventh Circuit held that, “where DOHSA applies, it preempts all wrongful-death remedies otherwise available under state law and general maritime law.” In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, 110 F.4th at 1012 (citations omitted). While the plaintiffs included state-law wrongful-death claims in their complaints, they later acknowledged that these claims are preempted by DOHSA.
“[W]here DOHSA applies, it preempts all wrongful-death remedies otherwise available under state law and general maritime law.” In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, 110 F.4th 1007, 1012 (7th Cir. 2024).
The plaintiffs, however, continued to contend that their state-law survival claims are not preempted by DOHSA. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that they could seek damages for the pain and suffering that their decedents experienced on the over-land portion of the flight. “It is difficult, however, to see how this could be a separate claim than a claim for pain and suffering the decedents experienced over water, minutes later,” the Seventh Circuit stated. 110 F.4th at 1012. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Dooley v. Korean Air Lines Co., 524 U.S. 116, 118 S. Ct. 1890, 141 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1998), it held that “DOHSA preempts all survivor actions grounded in state law or general maritime law that are based on the same facts as the fatal accident.” Id. at 1012–13.
“DOHSA preempts all survivor actions grounded in state law or general maritime law that are based on the same facts as the fatal accident.” In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, 110 F.4th 1007, 1012–13 (7th Cir. 2024).
Are the plaintiffs entitled to a jury trial?
The Seventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a jury trial, as DOHSA claims brought in federal court must proceed in admiralty, without a jury trial.
As previously mentioned, plaintiffs with in personam maritime claims typically have three options: (1) the plaintiff may file suit in federal court sitting in admiralty; (2) the plaintiff may file suit in federal court at law, assuming an alternative basis for federal jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizenship; or (3) the plaintiff may file suit in state court.
Unless a statute provides otherwise, if the plaintiff sues at law, either party can demand a jury trial, but if they sue in admiralty, the case will be tried by the court.
Here, Plaintiff No. 1 initially filed its case in Illinois state court. Boeing subsequently removed it to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois without objection. Plaintiff No. 1 demanded a jury trial and asserted that the district court had jurisdiction based on diversity; DOHSA; the Suits in Admiralty Act; and the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (“MMTJA”).
Plaintiff No. 2 initially filed its case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiff No. 2 demanded a jury trial and alleged that the district court had jurisdiction based on both diversity and the MMTJA.
To explain their right to a jury trial, the plaintiffs contended that non-admiralty sources of jurisdiction, such as diversity and the MMTJA, allowed them to assert their DOHSA claims “at law” and to demand a jury trial. Boeing contended that the plaintiffs with DOHSA claims can only proceed “in admiralty,” without a jury trial.
The Seventh Circuit agreed with Boeing. It found that “courts have construed language similar to DOHSA’s ‘may bring a civil action in admiralty’ language to require cases to be brought in admiralty.” 110 F.4th at 1015. Relying on the statutory language and the history of its application, the Seventh Circuit held that, “if a case involving only DOHSA claims is in federal court, it must proceed in admiralty, without a jury trial.” Id. at 1016 (citations omitted).
“[I]f a case involving only DOHSA claims is in federal court, it must proceed in admiralty, without a jury trial.” In re Lion Air Flight JT 610 Crash, 110 F.4th 1007, 1016 (7th Cir. 2024).
Notably, if the plaintiffs had brought their DOHSA claims in state court, they would have been tried by juries. This could apply to Plaintiff No. 1, who initially brought their claim in state court. The Court noted that Plaintiff No. 1 “could have tried to object to removal, relying on certain authorities that interpret the saving-to-suitors clause to block removal of otherwise removable admiralty claims.” 110 F.4th at 1017 n.8. The Court, however, was not in a position to consider that possibility here, as the case was removed to federal court without objection.
The information provided in this article is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. It should not be relied upon or applied without consulting an attorney to address your specific circumstances. Please note that this article was published on the date indicated and may not reflect subsequent changes in the law.
