In In re Genesis Marine, LLC, 164 F.4th 448 (5th Cir. 2026), the Fifth Circuit addressed what appeared to be a straightforward question: whether the shipowner missed the six-month deadline to file a limitation action. However, more complex questions lie beneath the surface of the dispute.
The claimant, who injured his back while working as a tankerman, filed suit against the shipowner in state court. In response, the shipowner raised limitation of liability as an affirmative defense. During the state court proceedings, evidence was produced indicating that the injury left the claimant totally and permanently disabled and unable to return to work in any capacity.
Nearly three years after the state action was initiated, the claimant submitted a settlement demand exceeding $20 million—an amount well above the value of the vessel and, according to the shipowner, far greater than awards typically granted for comparable back injuries in Louisiana. Shortly thereafter, the shipowner filed a limitation action in federal court, which was found to be untimely.
While this ended the Fifth Circuit’s inquiry, it does not end the matter. The shipowner must still confront a significant question: whether the state court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues relating to limitation of liability.
I. Background
Brandon Darrow was employed as a tankerman on the towing vessel M/V Anaconda, owned by Genesis Marine, LLC (“Genesis”). The M/V Anaconda and two barges owned by Genesis (collectively, the “Vessel”) were valued at $12.5 million.
In December 2020, Darrow injured his back while attempting to throw mooring lines to secure the barges during docking operations in Mount Airy, Louisiana.
In December 2021, Darrow sued Genesis in Louisiana state court, alleging that Genesis’s negligence and the Vessel’s unseaworthiness caused him to sustain “serious, painful injuries to his back, spine and other parts of his body and psychological, mental, and/or emotional injuries,” and seeking damages. The petition further alleged that, as a result of his injuries, Darrow was rendered unfit for duty and remained incapable of returning to work as a seaman.
In August 2022, Genesis filed its Answer, denying Darrow’s allegations and asserting that his injuries and damages, if any, occurred without the privity or knowledge of Genesis and that the claimed damages exceeded the value of Genesis’s interest in the M/V Anaconda and her pending freight. Genesis invoked the provisions of the Limitation of Liability Act, under which the plaintiff may not recover damages exceeding the value of Genesis’s interest in the M/V Anaconda and her pending freight, should Genesis be held liable.
During the state court proceedings, expert reports were produced, one of which, dated August 2024, indicated that Darrow was totally and permanently disabled and unable to return to work in any capacity due to the complexity of his injury. Following the production of these reports, Darrow’s counsel sent Genesis a settlement demand for $20,175,328.50, consisting of: (1) $327,558.50 for past cure; (2) $1,934,834.00 for future cure; (3) $3,912,936.00 for past and future lost wages, lost earning capacity, and fringe benefits; (4) $12,000,000.00 for general damages, including past, present, and future pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and physical disfigurement; and (5) $2,000,000.00 for punitive damages.
On December 13, 2024, Genesis filed a Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.1At the time Genesis filed its limitation action, the state court trial was scheduled for March 25, 2025. The District Court stayed the state court proceedings after Genesis filed its limitation action. Pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 30529(a), a shipowner has six months to initiate a limitation action in federal court after receiving written notice of a claim. Genesis argued that its limitation action was timely because it was filed within six months after receiving the first written notice of a limitable claim—specifically, Darrow’s settlement demand for over $20 million in August 2024. Genesis further asserted that the value of the Vessel on the date of the accident did not exceed $12.5 million.
Darrow filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Genesis’s limitation action was untimely because Genesis received written notice of a claim that could reasonably exceed the value of the Vessel more than two years before Genesis filed its limitation action. Darrow referenced his December 2021 Petition filed in Louisiana state court, where he said he could not return to work due to Genesis’s negligence and the Vessel’s unseaworthiness. Darrow also referenced Genesis’s August 2022 Answer admitting that the claimed damages far exceeded the value of the Vessel and her pending freight. According to Darrow, Genesis’s limitation action, filed on December 13, 2024, was untimely.
The District Court granted Darrow’s Motion for Summary Judgment, concluding that Genesis’s limitation action was untimely. In re Genesis Marine, LLC, No. CV 24-2881, 2025 WL 932782, at *9 (E.D. La. Mar. 27, 2025). The Court found that there was a reasonable possibility that damages would exceed the value of the Vessel as early as August 2022, as confirmed by Genesis’s statement in its Answer that the amount of damages claimed by Darrow “greatly exceed[ed]” the value of Genesis’s interest in the M/V Anaconda and her pending freight, together with Genesis’s undisputed knowledge of the seriousness of Darrow’s injuries and ongoing medical needs. Id. at *7. Moreover, evidence of Darrow’s injuries—including a doctor’s opinion that he was permanently disabled due to “failed back surgery syndrome,” which left him unable to return to work—was available to Genesis by early 2024, more than six months before Genesis filed its limitation action. Id.
Genesis appealed.
II. The Fifth Circuit’s Opinion: Limitation Action Was Untimely
On appeal, Genesis argued that the District Court erred in granting Darrow’s Motion for Summary Judgment for four reasons. First, it claimed that the Court treated 46 U.S.C. § 30529(a) as a jurisdictional rule rather than a claim-processing rule, contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s holding in In re Bonvillian Marine Serv., Inc., 19 F.4th 787 (5th Cir. 2021). Second, it argued that a genuine dispute of material fact existed as to when it received written notice that Darrow’s claim might exceed the value of the Vessel. Third, it contended that the Court improperly credited Darrow’s evidence and construed it in his favor. Fourth, it argued that the Court wrongly relied on an affirmative defense Genesis had asserted in the state-court action as evidence. The Fifth Circuit addressed each argument in turn.
1. The Six-Month Deadline: Jurisdictional Rule or Claim-Processing Rule—and Does It Matter Here?
The classification of a time bar as jurisdictional carries significant consequences. First, if the time bar is jurisdictional, courts lack authority to adjudicate claims filed outside the prescribed deadline. United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 423 (2015); see also Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 583 U.S. 17, 20 (2017) (“Failure to comply with a jurisdictional time prescription … deprives a court of adjudicatory authority over the case, necessitating dismissal—a ‘drastic’ result.” (citations omitted)). Second, jurisdictional rules are not subject to waiver or forfeiture. Hamer, 583 U.S. at 20. Third, jurisdictional time bars are not subject to equitable tolling. Wong, 575 U.S. at 413.
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that “most time bars are nonjurisdictional,” even when they are important or framed in mandatory terms, such as “shall be barred.” Id. at 410.
Given the harsh consequences of classifying the time bar as jurisdictional, Congress must clearly signal when it intends that result. Id. (“Congress must do something special, beyond setting an exception-free deadline, to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional and so prohibit a court from tolling it.”); see also Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 (2013) (“We inquire whether Congress has ‘clearly state[d]’ that the rule is jurisdictional; absent such a clear statement, we have cautioned, ‘courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.’” (citations omitted)). This does not mean that Congress needs “incant magic words.” Auburn, 568 U.S. at 153. Instead, the traditional tools of statutory construction must “plainly show” that Congress intended the time bar to have jurisdictional effect. Wong, 575 U.S. at 410.
Under 46 U.S.C. § 30529(a), “[t]he [limitation] action must be brought within 6 months after a claimant gives the owner written notice of a claim.” In Bonvillian, the Fifth Circuit held that this time limitation “is a mere claim-processing rule which has no bearing on a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” 19 F.4th at 794. This is because, although the provision is phrased in mandatory terms, it makes no explicit reference to jurisdiction. Id. at 793. The Fifth Circuit also relied on the provision’s placement within the United States Code, noting that it appears among provisions governing the standards and procedures applicable to the cause of action, rather than those allocating jurisdiction. Id.
Genesis argued that the District Court erred in treating 46 U.S.C. § 30529(a) as a jurisdictional rule rather than a claim-processing rule. The Fifth Circuit agreed that it is a claim-processing rule but explained that this did not affect the outcome of the case. “[J]ust because a rule is ‘nonjurisdictional’ does not necessarily mean it is not mandatory or that a court may otherwise close its eyes and ‘ignore’ a timely objection.” Liao v. Bondi, 162 F.4th 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted); see also Hamer, 583 U.S. at 20 (stating that, “[i]f properly invoked, mandatory claim-processing rules must be enforced”). Accordingly, Genesis’s argument failed.
2. Was There a Genuine Dispute as to Any Material Fact?
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sanders v. Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
Genesis argued that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding when it received written notice of a reasonable possibility that Darrow’s claim could exceed the value of the Vessel. The Fifth Circuit stated that the point at which Genesis received sufficient written notice that triggered a six-month deadline for filing a limitation action was a disputed legal conclusion, not a disputed fact. The Fifth Circuit found that Genesis admitted to the material facts and, accordingly, that the District Court correctly determined there were no genuine disputes of the material facts.
3. Was Evidence Construed in Darrow’s Favor?
The court “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing ‘all justifiable inferences … in the non-movant’s favor.’” Renwick v. PNK Lake Charles, L.L.C., 901 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Env’t Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2008)).
Genesis argued that the District Court improperly credited Darrow’s evidence over its own and drew inferences in Darrow’s favor. It maintained that there was no evidence of a “reasonable possibility” that Darrow’s claim could exceed the value of the Vessel until he made a $20 million settlement demand in August 2024. In Genesis’s view, the case involved a routine back injury to a low-wage employee. Genesis alleged that no comparable back-injury award in Louisiana had approached $12.5 million.
The Fifth Circuit found that the District Court properly considered the totality of the evidence and correctly granted summary judgment for Darrow. According to the Fifth Circuit, Genesis should have known that Darrow’s claim could exceed $12.5 million more than six months before filing its limitation action. In his state court petition, Darrow alleged painful injuries and sought several types of damages, including lifetime economic and non-economic damages. Although he did not specify a dollar amount, the Fifth Circuit found these allegations sufficient to establish a “reasonable possibility” that the damages could exceed the value of the Vessel. Genesis’s reliance on prior lower awards did not change that conclusion.
4. Did the District Court Err by Considering Genesis’s State-Court Affirmative Defense as Evidence?
In the state court proceedings, Genesis stated that the claimed damages far exceeded the value of the Vessel and her pending freight. In a case filed in federal court, Genesis argued that this statement—raised as an affirmative defense—was not a judicial admission and therefore could not be used as evidence to support summary judgment.
“A judicial admission is a formal concession in the pleadings or stipulations by a party or counsel that is binding on the party making them.” Martinez v. Bally’s Louisiana, Inc., 244 F.3d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 2001). “Although a judicial admission is not itself evidence, it has the effect of withdrawing a fact from contention.” Id. A statement made by counsel during trial may qualify as a judicial admission when it is made intentionally as a waiver, releasing the opposing party from the burden of proving the fact. Id. (citation omitted).
Judicial admissions are conclusive and binding upon the party making them, unless the court allows them to be withdrawn. Keller v. United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1199 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995). However, “judicial admissions are not conclusive and binding in a separate case from the one in which the admissions were made.” Universal Am. Barge Corp. v. J-Chem, Inc., 946 F.2d 1131, 1142 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 1968)).
Here, the Fifth Circuit found that the District Court did not err in considering Genesis’s state-court affirmative defense as evidence when granting Darrow’s motion for summary judgment. The District Court did not treat Genesis’s affirmative defense as a judicial admission. Although Genesis first raised the affirmative defense in its answer to Darrow’s state-court petition, it later acknowledged during this litigation that it had taken that position. That assertion formed part of the summary judgment record. The District Court’s decision did not rely primarily on that assertion; it was considered along with other evidence, and the totality of the evidence showed that, more than six months before filing its limitation action, Genesis had written notice of a reasonable possibility that Darrow’s claim could exceed the value of the Vessel.
The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed the District Court’s ruling that Genesis’s limitation action was untimely.
III. Takeaways
1. “While This Standard Is Not Toothless, It Is Also Not Particularly Stringent”: The “Reasonable Possibility” Standard and the Six-Month Deadline to File a Limitation Action
The Genesis case serves as a reminder to shipowners of the “reasonable possibility” standard. If written notice of a claim reveals a “reasonable possibility” that the claimed damages may exceed the value of the vessel and her pending freight, the shipowner has six months to file a limitation action in federal court if it chooses to do so.
Although this standard is “not toothless,” it is “not particularly stringent.” In re Eckstein Marine Serv. L.L.C., 672 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 2012). This standard requires a two-part inquiry: “(1) whether the writing communicates the reasonable possibility of a claim, and (2) whether it communicates the reasonable possibility of damages in excess of the vessel’s value.” In re The Complaint of RLB Contracting, Inc., as Owner of the Dredge Jonathan King Boyd its Engine, Tackle, Gear for Exoneration or Limitation of Liab., 773 F.3d 596, 602 (5th Cir. 2014).
If doubt exists as to the total amount of the claims or whether they will exceed the value of the vessel, the shipowner is not excused from the statutory deadline. Eckstein, 672 F.3d at 318 (citation omitted). A limitation action may be filed even when the total amount of damages remains uncertain. Id.
2. Do State Courts Have Jurisdiction to Decide the Applicability and Merits of a Limitation Defense?
In Genesis, the shipowner raised limitation of liability as an affirmative defense in the state court proceedings and later filed an untimely limitation action in federal court. The federal district court granted summary judgment in the claimant’s favor, barring the shipowner’s limitation action. This scenario raises the question of whether Genesis may still pursue a limitation defense in the state court action.
As a starting point, the shipowner is not required to file a limitation action in federal court every time it faces a claim. Such an action is one of the two options for the shipowner to assert the right to limitation of liability. Karim v. Finch Shipping Co., 265 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 2001). The other option is to raise limitation of liability as an affirmative defense in response to a claim filed in any court, including a state court. Id. The choice between these options requires careful consideration of the specific circumstances of the case, as each is governed by different rules and carries different consequences.
If there is only one claimant, the latter option—asserting limitation of liability as a defense—may seem attractive to the shipowner. Unlike a federal limitation action, it does not require the shipowner to deposit with the court an amount equal to the value of its interest in the vessel and pending freight, or to post approved security. Nor is the shipowner subject to the six-month filing deadline triggered by written notice of the claim.
This option, however, has drawbacks when multiple claimants are involved. The shipowner may face parallel claims in several jurisdictions. Additionally, if the shipowner raises limitation of liability as a defense in each case, rather than initiating a federal limitation action, the right to limit liability will apply separately to each claim. By contrast, in a federal limitation action, the limitation fund is distributed pro rata among the proven claims.
There is another risk associated with raising limitation of liability as an affirmative defense. If the claimant files suit in state court or in federal court sitting in diversity, the threshold question becomes whether those courts have jurisdiction to decide the applicability and merits of the limitation defense. In other words, can a state court—or a federal court proceeding outside its admiralty jurisdiction—decide issues such as the shipowner’s privity or knowledge? The answer is not entirely settled, and the lack of clarity creates strategic risk for shipowners who choose not to file a timely federal limitation action.
There is case law indicating that a state court is competent to decide the applicability and merits of the limitation defense, provided the shipowner has not invoked the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts by timely filing a limitation action. See, e.g., Mapco Petroleum, Inc. v. Memphis Barge Line, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tenn. 1993). The Supreme Court of Tennessee has emphasized that, in state court proceedings, the claimant in entitled to challenge the limitation defense both on its merits (i.e., the value of the vessel and her pending freight) and on its applicability (i.e., the shipowner’s privity and knowledge). Id. However, once the shipowner timely files a limitation action in federal court, jurisdiction over limitation of liability issues shifts to the federal court, and the state court may no longer adjudicate those issues. Id.
Conversely, there are cases in which state courts have declined to exercise jurisdiction over the issues pertaining to limitation of liability once they became contested. The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. Abel, 533 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1976), provides such an example.
In Cincinnati Gas, the claimant filed suit against the shipowner in state court, seeking $435,000 for injury to its marina, loss of profits, and other damages. The shipowner raised limitation of liability as an affirmative defense and moved for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit its liability to $52,500—the value of its tugboat. The claimant opposed the motion, arguing that material issues of fact existed regarding the shipowner’s privity or knowledge, the selection of the master and crew, and the applicability of limitation to consequential damages. The claimant also argued that the shipowner had failed to file a federal limitation action within six months of receiving written notice of the claim.
The state court denied summary judgment but stayed the proceedings to allow the shipowner to file a limitation action in federal court, which the shipowner subsequently did. The federal district court dismissed the petition as untimely. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit addressed a fundamental question: may a shipowner rely on a limitation defense pleaded in state court, or must the shipowner file a limitation action in federal court within six months after receiving written notice of the claim?
The Sixth Circuit held that once the claimant contests the right to limitation, the state court loses jurisdiction over that issue. Cincinnati Gas, 533 F.2d at 1005. Only an admiralty court may decide a contested limitation question. Id. The Court further held that the only method available to the shipowner to invoke that jurisdiction is to file a timely limitation petition. Id. Failure to do so within six months deprives the shipowner of the benefits of limitation of liability. Id. at 1005–06.
In reaching that conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931), and Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. 437 (1932).
In Langnes, the claimant filed suit in state court, and the shipowner subsequently filed a limitation action in federal court. The federal district court restrained the state court proceedings and issued a monition directing all claimants to file their claims in the limitation action. The claimant complied but moved to dissolve the restraining order. He argued that the state court had jurisdiction of the cause, and that the shipowner could assert limitation as a defense in the pending state action. The district court denied the motion.
The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the district court should have dissolved the restraining order and allowed the state case to proceed, while “retaining, as a matter of precaution, the petition for a limitation of liability to be dealt with in the possible but (since it must be assumed that [the claimant’s] motion was not an idle gesture but was made with full appreciation of the state court’s entire lack of admiralty jurisdiction) the unlikely event that the right of [the shipowner] to a limited liability might be brought into question in the state court, or the case otherwise assume such form in that court as to bring it within the exclusive power of a court of admiralty.” Langnes, 282 U.S. at 541–42.
Following the remission of the cause to the state court, the claimant “brought into question” the shipowner’s right to limited liability. Specifically, the claimant disputed the seaworthiness of the vessel and the absence of the shipowner’s privity or knowledge. The Supreme Court held that “[t]he matter was properly brought before the federal District Court,” and that once the question of the shipowner’s right to limited liability had been raised, “the cause became cognizable only in admiralty,” such that “further prosecution in the state court should be enjoined.” Ex parte Green, 286 U.S. at 440.
The Supreme Court further stated that “the state court has no jurisdiction to determine the question of the owner’s right to limited liability,” and that “if the value of the vessel [is] not accepted as the limit of the owner’s liability, the federal court is authorized to resume jurisdiction and dispose of the whole case.” Id. at 439–40.
Relying on this framework, the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati Gas stated that the procedure prescribed in Langnes, as modified by the six-month filing requirement, remains the preferred method for handling contested limitation issues originating in state court. 533 F.2d at 1005. When the shipowner files a federal limitation petition, he may move to stay proceedings on that petition until it is determined whether adjudication of the limitation issue is necessary. Id. If limitation is not contested in the state court and final judgment is entered without litigating that issue, the federal limitation proceeding may then be dismissed. Id.
In sum, in responding to the question whether the shipowner may rely on the limitation defense pleaded in state court or must file a limitation action in federal court within six months of receiving written notice of the claim, the Sixth Circuit answered that the prudent course is to file a limitation action in federal court. Id. The Court cautioned that “an owner who receives a notice of a claim acts at his peril if he fails to file a petition for limitation in a federal court within six months.” Id.
This approach stands in tension with the Mapco case discussed above, where the Supreme Court of Tennessee held that a state court may address the limitation defense both on its applicability and merits—including issues relating to the value of the vessel and her pending freight, as well as the shipowner’s privity or knowledge—where the shipowner elects not to file a timely limitation action in federal court. 849 S.W.2d at 318.
In Mapco, the Court distinguished Langnes and Ex parte Green on the ground that, in those cases, the shipowner had filed a federal limitation petition, whereas in Mapco no such petition had been filed. Id. at 317. The Mapco Court interpreted those decisions as holding only that when an injured party files suit in state court and the shipowner responds by filing a limitation petition in federal court, jurisdiction over the limitation issue lies with the federal court. Id. Under Mapco, if the shipowner does not initiate a timely federal limitation action, the state court retains jurisdiction to decide both the applicability and merits of the limitation defense.
By contrast, the Sixth Circuit interpreted Langnes and Ex parte Green to mean that a state court is competent to grant relief by way of limitation only if the claimant does not contest the shipowner’s right to limit liability. Cincinnati Gas, 533 F.2d at 1003.
These differing interpretations create strategic uncertainty for shipowners.
Returning to the scenario at hand: suppose the shipowner raises limitation as an affirmative defense in state court and later files an untimely limitation petition in federal court, which is dismissed, as occurred in Genesis. Would the state court still possess jurisdiction to adjudicate the limitation defense? Gustavo A. Martinez-Tristani argues that such jurisdiction should be recognized:
We submit the vessel owner should be allowed to pursue their defense even if the petition for limitation of liability is dismissed for being untimely filed. In such a scenario, the federal court has not addressed the limitation defense on the merits and the only decision the court has made is whether the vessel owner timely invoked the right to a concursus proceeding. Of course, if the admiralty court decides the petition has been timely filed, the admiralty court will have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the limitation issue in the context of that concursus proceeding. But in the absence of such a proceeding going forward, there is no legitimate reason why a state court should not be deemed to have the jurisdiction to adjudicate all limitation issues in connection with any pending action before the court.2Gustavo A. Martinez-Tristani, With the Exception of Handling Concursus Proceedings, State Courts Should Be Deemed to Have Jurisdiction to Adjudicate All Limitation of Liability Issues Under the Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act, in 23 Benedit’s Mar. Bull. 45, 55–56 (Joshua S. Force & Robert J. Zapf eds., 2025).
The varying interpretations of Langnes and Ex parte Green demonstrate the need for a uniform approach. Under the current legal framework, shipowners should carefully plan their strategy to assert their right to limitation of liability, taking into account the precedents in relevant jurisdictions.
The information provided in this article is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. It should not be relied upon or applied without consulting an attorney to address your specific circumstances. Please note that this article was published on the date indicated and may not reflect subsequent changes in the law.
