June 2026 was an eventful month. The civil forfeiture of the luxury yacht Amadea, Maine’s claim of title to a historic shipwreck, maritime liens asserted over vessels by a supplier of necessaries, and a multi-jurisdiction “Banking Days” clause in a ship sale contract: these are just some of the issues courts considered. Here is a closer look at the month’s notable rulings and industry developments, and the lessons they carry.
No Registration, No Class, No Oversight: TSB Report on the Loss of the Titan Submersible
On June 17, 2026, the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) released a report investigating the loss of the Titan submersible.
Nearly three years earlier, on June 18, 2023, the Titan, owned by a U.S. corporation OceanGate, Inc., began a dive to the wreck of the Titanic. The expedition departed from St. John’s, Canada. The Titan was supported by the Canadian cargo vessel Polar Prince, which towed it to the dive location and served as the base for OceanGate’s operations, including communication with and tracking of the submersible. About 1 hour and 45 minutes into the descent, the surface support team lost communication with the submersible. Four days later, the U.S. Coast Guard confirmed that the wreckage of the Titan had been found on the ocean floor near the Titanic. All five people on board lost their lives.
The TSB investigation found critical safety issues, including the use of carbon fibre for the Titan’s pressure hull, a material with no prior use in human-occupied submersibles, and progressive damage to the hull during repeated dives, which eventually led to the submersible’s implosion.
Another key finding concerns the lack of regulatory oversight. The Titan was unregistered, unclassed, and did not undergo regulatory inspections in Canada, the United States, or the Bahamas, where it operated.
How could that happen?
Internationally, there are two primary ways for submersibles to be subject to oversight: (1) obtaining classification from a classification society, and (2) registering with a flag state that provides regulatory oversight. Both methods rely largely on the owner or operator taking the initiative. In many countries, classification is not mandatory for submersibles, and only a few countries have domestic regulatory oversight for submersibles and processes to verify if submersibles are registered.
OceanGate completed neither process for the Titan.
“If oversight of submersibles, such as through classification or registration with a flag state, relies largely on voluntary action from owners and operators, submersibles are likely to operate without oversight, increasing the risk they will not be compliant with international and national safety regulations and guidelines that provide a minimum level of safety,” the TSB concludes.
Read the report here.
Second Circuit Affirms Forfeiture of Superyacht Amadea
United States v. The M/Y Amadea, 177 F.4th 224 (2d Cir. 2026)
The U.S. Government seized the M/Y Amadea, a 348-foot superyacht, in Fiji in April 2022 and then filed a civil forfeiture action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Government alleged that the yacht was beneficially owned by Suleiman Kerimov, a sanctioned Russian individual, and that transactions involving more than one million dollars routed through U.S. financial institutions to maintain the vessel constituted “specified unlawful activity” under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7), rendering the vessel forfeitable.
Eduard Khudainatov and his company Millemarin Investments Ltd. filed a claim asserting that he, not Kerimov, was the beneficial owner of the Amadea through his ownership of Millemarin, which held legal title to the yacht. The Government moved to strike the claim, arguing that the claimants were mere straw owners without constitutional standing to contest the forfeiture.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the motion to strike, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimants were mere straw owners and thus lacked constitutional standing to contest the forfeiture. The court found that the claimants had transferred possession, dominion, control, and all financial interest in the Amadea to a Cayman Islands entity for €225 million pursuant to a September 2021 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), retaining only bare legal title. It entered a final judgment of forfeiture in March 2025.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. To establish constitutional standing to contest a forfeiture, a claimant must show a “facially colorable interest in the proceedings,” meaning an injury traceable to the challenged conduct and redressable by the relief sought. In a civil forfeiture action, a true owner will ordinarily meet this test because loss of property is a real injury, whereas a straw owner will not. Holding title for another, a straw owner suffers no injury when the property is taken and therefore lacks constitutional standing to contest the forfeiture. The Government made a prima facie showing of straw ownership, and the claimants failed to rebut it: they stopped using the yacht after the September 2021 MOA, none of Khudainatov’s personal possessions were aboard when it was seized, and they offered no evidence of any insurance payments after the transfer.
Takeaway: The case illustrates that counsel opposing a motion to strike under Rule G(8)(c)(i)(B) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions on behalf of a corporate titleholder cannot rely solely on the certificate of registry or share register. The claimant must prove that it has a “facially colorable interest” in the vessel that goes beyond bare title. Importantly, the evidence of such “interest” should be contemporaneous with the date of seizure. Where a sale or transfer agreement has stripped away the incidents of ownership, and in the absence of any other specific, documented interest, bare title will not suffice to overcome the threshold standing inquiry.
Read our analysis here and the court’s opinion here.
A No-Lien Clause Is Not Self-Executing: Actual Knowledge Is Required
Trailer Bridge, Inc. v. Louisiana International Marine, L.L.C., No. 25-30331, 2026 WL 1742235 (5th Cir. June 11, 2026)
Work Cat Trans Gulf LLC (“Work Cat”), a container-on-barge service provider, chartered two barges from Trailer Bridge, Inc. The charter agreement included a no-lien clause by which Work Cat agreed to keep the barges free of maritime liens and to indemnify Trailer Bridge against any that arose.
To tow the barges, Work Cat separately chartered two tugboats from Louisiana International Marine (“LIM”). Work Cat subsequently failed to pay LIM’s invoices and entered bankruptcy. LIM then asserted maritime liens against the barges. Trailer Bridge sought to invalidate LIM’s maritime liens, relying on the no-lien clause contained in its contract with Work Cat.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that LIM held valid maritime liens against both barges for the value of the towage services. In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act, 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a), under which a party may obtain a maritime lien if it provides necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person authorized by the owner. LIM was found to have satisfied these requirements by providing towage services (qualifying as “necessaries”) to the barges (qualifying as “vessels”) on the order of Work Cat’s agents, who, as officers or agents appointed by a charterer, were statutorily presumed to have authority to procure such services.
A no-lien clause, which Trailer Bridge sought to invoke, did not defeat LIM’s maritime liens. The Fifth Circuit clarified that such a clause is effective only where the supplier of necessaries has actual knowledge of it before entering into the contract. LIM was found not to have actual knowledge of the no-lien clause at the time it entered into the contract with Work Cat, nor did it have a duty to investigate whether any no-lien provision applied to the barges.
Takeaway: The case shows that a no-lien clause does not, by itself, shield a vessel from a third-party supplier of necessaries acting in good faith. The supplier’s statutory maritime lien attaches unless the vessel owner can demonstrate that the supplier had actual knowledge of the clause at the time of contracting. Where actual notice cannot be shown, the clause leaves the owner exposed: the lien runs against the vessel in rem, while the owner’s only fallback, the indemnity, runs against the charterer in personam and may be of little value once the charterer has defaulted and cannot pay.
Read the court’s opinion here.
Maine Takes Title to the Delhi Under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act
JJM, LLC, Plaintiff v. S/V DELHI, Defendant, No. 1:24-CV-00072-JCN, 2026 WL 1801112 (D. Me. June 23, 2026)
The Delhi, a wooden-hulled vessel built in Saco, Maine in 1872–1873, sank off the Maine coast in April 1893, loaded with more than 10,000 granite paving stones. She now rests under about 120 feet of water on submerged lands that Maine holds in trust for the public. JJM, LLC located the wreck in 2023 and then brought an in rem action claiming ownership under the law of finds or, in the alternative, a salvage award. Maine intervened and moved for summary judgment, asserting title under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act (ASA).
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine granted Maine summary judgment.
To establish title to a shipwreck under the ASA, a State must establish that the shipwreck is abandoned, and that it is either embedded or it is “on submerged lands of a State and is included in or determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register [of Historic Places].” 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a). The ASA displaces the law of finds and salvage that JJM relied on. 43 U.S.C. § 2106(a).
The court found that the State satisfied the requirements of the ASA. First, the State proved abandonment: the wreck sat untouched for about 130 years, there were no recovery attempts, and no person or entity has appeared in the case to assert an ownership interest in the wreck or its cargo. Second, the State established that the Delhi lies on the State’s submerged lands and had been determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register by the Keeper of the National Register on August 21, 2025. Although the court found a genuine dispute as to whether the wreck was embedded, that issue was immaterial because eligibility for the National Register provides an independent basis for title under the ASA. The court could not revisit the Keeper’s National Register eligibility determination in this title action; JJM’s challenge to that determination is the subject of a separate lawsuit.
Takeaway: The ASA gives a State two independent ways to win title, so a claimant who found the wreck can prevail on embeddedness and still lose once the wreck is determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register. That eligibility determination is administrative, and a title court will not disturb it, so any challenge must be brought separately against the agency.
Read the court’s order here.
Commercial Court Confirms the Measure of Damages for a Missed COA Shipment
Transatlantica Commodities Pte Ltd v Eurochem Trading GmbH [2026] EWHC 1494 (Comm)
Owners (Transatlantica) and charterers (EuroChem) entered into a contract of affreightment (COA) dated 21 May 2020 for the carriage of fertiliser from Sillamäe, Estonia to ports in Brazil and North America between 15 May and 15 November 2020, providing for three cargoes, or four at charterers’ option. For each shipment the COA set a sequence: charterers had to declare a four-day laycan at least 15 days in advance, owners then had to nominate a vessel at least five working days before the laycan and narrow it to three days, and charterers had to approve the vessel within 24 hours.
The first two shipments passed without incident. For the third, charterers declared a loading window of 12 to 15 October, but owners nominated the Friedrich Schulte for 5–10 November 2020, which did not comply with the COA, and later confirmed that no vessel was available for October. Charterers chartered a substitute, the Abtenauer, on the open market to carry the cargo, reserving their right to claim damages for owners’ breach of contract. The parties continued to deal and later agreed that the Friedrich Schulte would carry a different fertiliser cargo in November, which it did.
An LMAA tribunal held that owners had breached the COA by failing to provide a vessel for the October shipment and awarded charterers loss-of-bargain damages based on the difference between the contract rate and the market rate. Owners appealed under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996.
Henshaw J dismissed the appeal, holding the tribunal had made no error of law. “Owners’ case proceeds on the incorrect premise that the Tribunal awarded Charterers damages for late performance, when in fact, Charterers were claiming, and the Tribunal awarded, damages for nonperformance of the shipment,” he states. When owners could not provide a vessel, that obligation was replaced by an obligation to pay damages, calculated by reference to the difference between the contract and market rates. The later Friedrich Schulte voyage did not change that: it carried a different cargo at COA rates and was a separate adventure that neither cured the breach nor reduced the charterers’ recoverable loss.
Takeaway:The decision reaffirms the contract/market measure of damages for a missed COA shipment and draws a clean line between non-performance and delay. Once an owner cannot provide a conforming vessel within the declared laycan, the shipment is simply not performed, and the charterer’s recoverable loss is the cost of covering in the market. Subsequent voyages, even using the same vessel that was a non-compliant nomination, are treated as separate adventures unless the parties agree that they replace the missed shipment.
Read the judgment here.
A Multi-Jurisdiction “Banking Days” Clause Says Which Days Count, Not How Long They Last: Commercial Court Clarifies the Payment Deadline in a Ship Sale Contract
Songa Product and Chemical Tankers IV AS v Gardsea Shipping Inc [2026] EWHC 1559 (Comm)
In July 2022, the sellers (Songa) agreed to sell the tanker Songa Coral to the buyers (Gardsea) for USD 25 million under the MOA based on the Saleform 2012. The MOA required payment to be released from an escrow account at Nordea Bank in Norway no later than three “Banking Days” after notice of readiness was given. The term “Banking Days” was defined as days on which banks were open in the country of the currency (US dollars) and in a list of countries including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Turkey, the UAE, Greece, and Norway.
Notice of readiness was given on 2 September 2022. After the weekend and the Labor Day in the United States and Canada, the three Banking Days expired at the end of 8 September, which was itself a Banking Day. No payment reached the Nordea escrow account by midnight Norway time, and at 00.09 on 9 September Norway time the sellers served notice of cancellation, when it was still 8 September further west. The payment into the escrow account was made on 9 September during the working day in Norway, at a time when it was still 8 September in Hawaii, the most western part of the United States.
An LMAA tribunal found in favor of the buyers, holding that the buyers had until midnight at the end of 8 September 2022 in Hawaii—not midnight at the end of 8 September 2022 in Norway—to perform their payment obligation. The sellers appealed under section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996.
Paul Stanley KC allowed the appeal, finding the tribunal’s conclusion to be legally incorrect. “In my view, the purpose of the ‘definition’ of ‘Banking Days’ is not to define what is meant by ‘day’, but to identify which calendar days count for the purpose of calculating intervals, and which do not. The definition takes as its starting point … the idea of a ‘day’, meaning simply a calendar day, identifiable by date,” he states. If the buyers’ definition is accepted, it creates a “day” lasting about 37 to 38 hours (depending on the time of year), starting at midnight in the UAE and ending at midnight in Hawaii. During this period, the relevant locations pass through three different calendar dates. On this approach, a single “day” would begin at midnight in the UAE at the start of 8 September 2022 (which was mid-afternoon on 7 September in Hawaii) and end 37 hours later at midnight in Hawaii at the end of 8 September 2022 (by which time it would already be the afternoon of 9 September in the UAE). As Paul Stanley KC notes, it is hard to see this as a “day” in the ordinary sense. If the contract establishes 8 September as the last day for payment, the usual and common-sense interpretation applies: a calendar day ends at midnight, and the relevant place is where the obligation must be performed. The core obligation, releasing the balance from a Norwegian escrow account, was to be performed in Norway, so payment was due by midnight in Oslo, and the sellers were entitled to cancel.
Takeaway: The decision confirms that a multi-jurisdiction “Banking Days” clause tells you which days count towards a contractual period, not how long each day lasts. Absent clear contrary wording, a time-limited obligation must be performed by midnight local time at the place of performance, and listing several jurisdictions does not stretch the deadline to the last time zone on the list. It is also a rare successful section 69 appeal, in which the tribunal’s interpretation produced a commercially improbable “overlapping-day” result, and the court substituted its own view of the law.
Read the judgment here.
Finally, June 2026 saw the publication of the arbitral award in the long-running dispute brought by Ukraine against Russia concerning coastal State rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait. Given its complexity and importance, I have chosen to reserve it for a dedicated analysis rather than summarize it here.
This concludes this month’s selection of admiralty and maritime law updates. Thank you for reading, and see you next month! ⛵
The information provided in this article is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. It should not be relied upon or applied without consulting an attorney to address your specific circumstances. Please note that this article was published on the date indicated and may not reflect subsequent changes in the law.
